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Innoflight’s Secure Space Mesh Networking development and prototyping efforts started at its incorporation over 15 
years ago with a vision of establishing end-to-end Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity in and through space.  A number 
of space industry trends have accelerated the demand for space networking: (a) the widespread adoption of enterprise-
grade and cloud-based, IP-centric ground system architectures; (b) the accelerated growth of both commercial and 
government proliferated Low Earth Orbit (pLEO) constellations leveraging small satellites (SmallSats); (c) the 
maturation, miniaturization and commoditization of high-speed Radio Frequency (RF), Free Space Optical (FSO) 
Inter-Satellite Links (ISLs), and high-performance flight processors for aforementioned SmallSats; and (d) the need 
for All-Domain Operations (ADO) seamlessly and autonomously integrating space, airborne, terrestrial, maritime and 
underwater networks.  Furthermore, data encryption, for reasons of either National Security or monetized mission data 
protection, creates additional challenges to effectively switch/route and encrypt/decrypt ciphertext data across a mesh 
network.  Lastly, with the projection of multiple and multi-national pLEO constellations, it is critical to negotiate link 
security real-time for dynamic, trusted nodes, and prevent inadvertent or intentional networking with 
unknown/untrusted nodes. 
Innoflight will discuss the aforementioned relevant space industry trends and commercial and government initiatives, 
including DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) Blackjack and Space Development Agency’s 
(SDA) National Defense Space Architecture (NDSA), and then identify the technical challenges for secure space mesh 
networking and decompose these challenges with two popular frameworks: (a) the individual layers, especially Layer 
2 (data/link layer) and Layer 3 (network layer), within the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model; and (b) the 
control and data planes within the Software Defined Networking (SDN) model.  Innoflight will present its 
development and prototyping efforts, specific to these challenges, including recent work funded under a 2019 Space 
Pitch Day award and leveraging its general-purpose processing and networking CFC-400X platform, and conclude by 
identifying remaining gaps: including technical, commercial and policy; to fully realize interoperable secure space 
mesh networking.. 
INTRODUCTION 
Future space communications are moving towards an 
enterprise architecture.  While this visionary statement 
may mean different things to different people, the reason 
this is happening is to move away from stovepipe 
systems and decrease the amount of time it takes 
communications to travel end to end.  Every space 
system developing and sustaining their own individual 
communications segments results in redundant costs and 
a communications and ground processing budget that is 
no longer affordable.  A critical capability that enables 
the space community to move away from stovepipe 
systems is networking – not just space-to-space 
networking but transparent multi-domain networking 
from space to aerial and terrestrial systems as well. Per 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-121, the military cannot fight in 
Cyberspace without networking as “Cyberspace 
Operations are enabled by the Department of Defense 
(DoD) Information Networks (DoDIN).” The DoDIN 
has replaced the Global Information Grid (GIG) 
terminology and now represents the globally 
interconnected information capabilities for the DoD. 
General Hyten said it best in an article that dates back to 
20082:  “It’s really all about the network.  In the near 
future, our satellite capabilities will begin to look much 
different than today, and our operations will begin to 
look much different as well.  Rather than single stove-
piped satellites providing localized effects on the ground, 
our satellites will transition into part of a network.  They 
will be even more joint and interoperable than we can 
imagine today.  Everything we do will be on or through 
the joint network…”  It is the near future, Space 
Enterprise is happening but, as usual, change or 
paradigm shifts in our space systems and operations can 
be excruciatingly slow. 
Moving forward with networks in and through space we 
know that critical elements to success are 
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interoperability and above all, security.  The National 
Security Agency’s High Assurance Internet Protocol 
Encryption Interoperability Specification (NSA’s 
HAIPE® IS) and IPsec Minimum Essential 
Interoperability Requirements (IPMEIR) provide the 
framework to meet both of these elements. 
Internet Protocol in Space 
The use of Internet Protocol (IP) in space has many 
benefits that are largely associated with the fact that IP is 
so proven and widely proliferated in commercial and 
industrial hardware and software systems.  In addition to 
an extensive number of applications and related 
standards/protocols that work directly with IP, there are 
encryption interoperability specifications associated 
with one of these protocols in particular – namely IPsec.  
There are two flavors of high assurance encryption 
specifications for IP -- HAIPE (restricted DoD 
communications) and IPMEIR (a configuration profile 
of commercial IPsec), which both support the use of the 
AES256 encryption algorithm.  IP packet-based traffic 
can be divided into any number of “security 
associations” (SAs) that are protected with unique keys.  
A HAIPE and/or IPMEIR compliant system is designed 
to be fully compatible with a significant number of 
existing terrestrial boxes (e.g., radios, terminals) with 
each update of the specification designed to be 
backwards compatible to previous ones.  Compliance 
with the specification means the abilty to operate and 
maintain secure IP communications end-to-end 
regardless of the communications medium. 
A HAIPE/IPMEIR in space then is no different from a 
HAIPE/IPMEIR on the ground.  If compliant with the 
specification, then interoperability is ensured.  The 
physical waveform and signal characteristics will likely 
be different between space and non-space applications 
but those have no impact to the encryption/networking 
layer that is implemented into the individual system’s 
communication and processing equipment.  By enabling 
secure IP from a spacecraft to end user including any 
node within that network, traditional space 
communication applications that can now be 
accomplished as a result of secure addressing and 
associations of all the data instead of dedicated 
communication pipes or channels for each type of 
application (e.g., spacecraft command and control (C2), 
protection of spacecraft subsystem / payload data and/or 
control, protection of payload data and/or control 
traffic).  While this is a well-understood and used 
concept for systems that rely on networking and packet-
based protocols, space communication links are still 
stuck using traditional point-to-point serial 
communications protocols. 
A secure space networking communications architecture 
maintains support for end-to-end native IP which could 
be easily interpreted as ‘Wi-Fi for space’ [See Figure 1]. 
 
Figure 1.  By using IP as the space communications 
transport, a satellite bus network and/or network of 
spacecraft can transparently “connect” to the 
DoDIN and any certified ground user. 
While networking and service-oriented architecture 
(SOA) methods and protocols are more and more 
commonly used in space system architecture, the space 
communication links themselves have not migrated to a 
networking protocol or waveform thus adhering to 
legacy communications which result in “bridging” IP 
and performing IP-to-serial or serial-to-IP translations 
along the way [See Figure 2]. 
 
Figure 2.  Transparent routing between networks 
on-board spacecraft and amongst terrestrial users is 
severed by legacy serial-based communications. 
Part of the reason for DoD space link communications to 
lag in adopting an IP-based physical architecture is the 
current reliance on bulk and usually custom encryption 
methods and the non-availability of a qualified 
packetized encryptor. For secure IP space 
communications, HAIPE / IPMEIR appliances should be 
adapted and certified since they meet existing NSA 
specifications based on Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) protocols – the worldwide body for the 
development and promotion of IP-based specifications 
that frequently become standards. 
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The use of HAIPE or IPMEIR appliances in space will 
enable high assurance and/or NSA certified protection 
(with built-in authentication) of native IP space 
communication links.  While this is a significant 
advantage to space system architecture, there is also the 
advantage of operating over a myriad of capable private 
and public networks and eliminating the serial ‘daisy-
chaining’ with expensive and unique front-end 
processing equipment. Furthermore, compatible ground 
equipment for decryption (or uplink encryption) is quite 
prolific with an estimated 250,000+ HAIPE units in the 
field.  From a cost perspective, a typical HAIPE is less 
than $10K/unit while the cost of space crypto boxes can 
easily run an order of magnitude higher with less 
availability and selection.  The elimination of ‘space 
unique’ communication equipment from ground systems 
will ultimately allow more commercial and independent 
ground stations to become force multipliers for missions. 
Mesh Network Definition 
The network is defined as a “regular constellation mesh” 
network. In this network definition, a network node can 
be a spacecraft, a ground station, or a user. For the 
purposes of this architecture, Spacecraft Local Area 
Network (SLAN) refers to the devices within a single 
spacecraft that are capable of receiving or transmitting 
data to each other or to other nodes. A user is an endpoint 
of the network on the ground that is accessing the 
spacecraft network via a ground station. A regular 
constellation network is one where the orbits of 
spacecraft are constrained into many defined orbital 
planes, where there are several spacecraft in each orbit. 
The orbital planes are of different inclinations, and orbits 
may be of different altitudes. A regular constellation 
consists of rings of satellites where each satellite has a 
consistent node in front of and behind it. There are also 
neighboring rings where ring-to-ring (cross-plane) 
communication is possible. A node’s neighbors are 
constantly changing due to the orbital planes having 
different altitude and inclinations, causing the need for 
frequency dynamic routing updates. The Starlink 
constellation in Figure 3 is an example of a regular 
constellation. 
A mesh network refers to a form of ad hoc network 
where nodes have rich interconnection with one another. 
However, each node will not be able to communicate 
directly with every other node in the network, therefore 
having only partial mesh visibility. Each node has partial 
network connectivity via direct link to its neighbors, yet 
the protocol for routing traffic enables full mesh network 
connectivity. The number of crosslinks per node depends 
on the constellation architecture. In an ad hoc network, 
nodes move in and out of range of each other. Old links 
of nodes moving out of range will be severed and new 
nodes coming into range will need to create new 
connections. Routes that existed on severed links must 
be rerouted onto different active links.  
 
Figure 3: A Regular Constellation (Starlink) 
IP-BASED SPACE MESH NETWORK 
The space sector is currently undergoing a revolution 
where traditional “battlestar” style missions are 
transforming into constellations, swarms, and mega 
constellations. If we extrapolate this to the number of 
spacecraft predicted in the near future, it becomes clear 
that we lack the cyber secure space networking 
capability necessary to enable this transformation. On 
the ground side, it is also critical to enhance Mission 
Operations Centers to securely connect to commercial 
and other non-DoD controlled ground stations. 
Current Space Mesh Network Efforts 
Space Development Agency’s Transport Layer Tranche 
0 constellation consists of two planes of SVs in near-
polar orbits. 
Two types of SVs: 
 Group A provides in-and out-of-plane crosslinks, as 
well as support of non-transport SVs and optical 
links to the ground 
 Group B provides Link-16 capability and crosslinks 
in-plane to the Group A SVs 
Each plane includes both types of SVs: 
Parameter Group A Group B 
Number of Planes 2 
SVs per Plane 7 3 
Altitude 1000 km 
Inclination 80-100 degrees 
Node Separation 31.64 degrees 
Mean Anomaly 
Seperation 
51.43 deg 36 deg 
Interplane 
Phasing 
25.71 deg 18 deg 
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OISLs per SV 4 2 In-Plane 
Mission 
Payload(s) 
IBS Link 16, IBS 
TT&C Downlink Ka Ka 
Navigation GPS GPS 
To implement SDA’s mesh networking Innoflight has 
developed the generalized payload avionics architecture 
leveraging high TRL products (for both transport and 
tracking layers) in Figure 4.  Note that instantiations of 
this architecture are being used for SDA Tranche 04. 
 
Figure 4: Innoflight's Generalized SDA Payload 
Avionics Architecture 
Key to the architecture is Innoflight’s CFC-400X 
platform product, which can be offered as a general-
purpose processing and networking platform with full 
customer control, or in various networking & network 
encryption personalities, including Layer-2 switching 
(SWC-300), DSCP-capable routing (RTR-400) or mesh 
network HAIPE-compatible encryption (ECU-400).  
Collectively, the red-side SLAN, HAIPE encryption, and 
black-side SLAN is described as the Secure Space 
Networking Communications Processor (SSNCP) and 
discussed later, especially advanced black-side 
networking.  The CFC-400X supports secure on-orbit 
reprogramming allowing for ground and on-orbit 
networking experiments. 
The CFC-400X has its origins with DARPA System F6 
as an F6 Technology Package (F6TP) providing 
hardware processing, common spacecraft & payload I/O, 
networking and crypto resources.  With its four 1.2 GHz 
ARM Cortex-53 cores the CFC-400X also can serve as 
the Battle Management Command, Control and 
Communications (BMC3) processor and Mission Data 
Processor (MDP) functions.  If additional processing is 
needed for a Wide Field of View (WFOV) sensor 
Innoflight also has its General-Purpose Graphics 
Processing Unit (GPGPU) based CFC-500 product. 
While many of the interfaces are IP-centric, initially 
1000BASE-T Gigabit Ethernt, the CFC-400X also 
supports the necessary I/O – including SpaceWire, 
LVDS and RS-422 – to interface to various mission 
links, such as K-Band via Innoflight’s SCR-108 or third-
party Free Space Optical (FSO) or Optical Inter-Satellite 
Link (OISL).  For the Telemetry, Tracking and 
Command (TT&C) link to support existing DoD and 
commercial ground stations a more traditional serial 
communications with bulk encryption is shown in the 
architecture.  However, in future tranches we anticipate 
TT&C as part of the SLAN with its own security 
association.  Lastly, to enable advanced Assured (or 
Alternate) Pointing Navigation and Timing (APNT) 
features Innoflight offers a High Accuracy Timing 
Module (HATM) platform to source and sink 1PPS and 
10 MHz timing signals, and perform timing functions, 
across signals from GPS receiver(s), RF & optical links 
and an internal Chip-Scale Atomic Clock (CSAC). 
Innoflight’s Research 
Innoflight’s objective is to introduce mesh networking 
technology for spacecraft constellations and allow them 
to be securely accessible via government and 
commercial gateway resources such as SATCOM and 
Remote Tracking Stations (RTS). The result is a mesh 
network of satellites, ground stations, and users. This 
objective will be achieved via two (2) major elements:  
1. The Ground Station Gateway called the High 
Assurance Missions Operations Gateway 
(HAMOG), and  
2. The Secure Space Networking Communications 
Processor (SSNCP) that establishes and maintains a 
secure network of satellites using a L2/L3 Router.  
The HAMOG brings commercial ground stations into 
the mesh network by enabling a Spacecraft Operations 
Center (SOC) to securely access and communicate with 
the network of satellites via a commercial RTS in 
addition to its own space link capabilities. The SSNCP 
connects spacecraft to the mesh network via advanced 
networking and transport capabilities implemented on 
low Size Weight and Power (SWaP) hardware. Figure 5 
presents the concept of the space mesh network. 
Satellites that are not in view of the SOC can 
transfer/relay data over the network (via crosslinks), or 
by HAMOG via commercial RTS. 
The SSNCP is a fully featured communications 
hardware stack. Each satellite in the network is equipped 
with an SSNCP, which creates a dynamic network, 
which is space-to-ground (ground link) and space-to-
space (crosslink) capable. The SSNCP consists of a stack 
of three (3) Innoflight Compact Flight Computers CFC-
400X platforms, each programmed with a different 
personality of software and firmware, and an Innoflight 
Software-defined Compact Radio (SCR) such as the 
SCR-104 (S-band), SCR-106 (X-band) or SCR-108 (K-
band). The three (3) CFC-400Xs in the stack are the 
Space Ethernet Switch SWC-300, the Mesh Networking 
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HAIPE-compatible End Cryptographic Unit ECU-400, 
and the Layer 2 Space Node Processor (L2SNP).  
 
Figure 5: Secure Space Networking Concept 
Figure 6 shows the end-to-end hardware architecture of 
a SOC user accessing the mesh network via an RTS. 
Satellites that are in view of one another and with active 
crosslinks are accessible via the SOC. The SOC encrypts 
traffic using a HAIPE at its location. The user at the SOC 
begins a secure session between the HAMOG-SOC and 
the HAMOG-RTS. The encrypted traffic destined for a 
spacecraft is then sent to an RTS over the HAMOG 
secured pipe. This provides two (2) layers of security for 
the traffic. The RTS then uplinks the traffic to any 
satellite within its range. Each link to spacecraft and 
between spacecraft are secured at the link level by the 
SSNCP, providing a second layer of security. The two 
(2) layers of security for HAMOG and SSNCP traffic is 
shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 6: End-to-End System Architecture 
The L2SNP decides if the traffic is destined for itself or 
a different satellite in the network. That satellite then 
forwards the traffic to the destination satellite within its 
network. Once the destination satellite receives the 
traffic, its L2SNP determines the destination is on the 
Spacecraft Local Area Network (SLAN) and forwards 
the traffic to the Space HAIPE (S-HAIPE) for 
decryption. 
 
Figure 7: Two Layers of Security 
This Innoflight research provides a cyber-secure space 
communications networking capability at the mission 
level that is integral to a resilient DoD Space Enterprise. 
This capability translates to satellite Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) expandability through 
secure operations with standard commercial Internet 
Protocol (IP)-based communications and infrastructure – 
something currently not possible with the DoD’s 
dedicated satellite ground network and esoteric serial 
(point-to-point) communications interface equipment. A 
cyber-secure space networking capability for the DoD 
will be able to respond to emerging infrastructure threats, 
ensure resiliency, and provide ultimate flexibility to 
space asset mission operations. On the ground side, this 
research will provide the capability for DoD operation 
centers to securely connect to commercial and other non-
DoD controlled ground stations without the need for 
COMSEC. 
L2SNP OVERVIEW 
The Layer 2 Secure Network Processor (L2SNP) 
contains the functionality for the L2 Router. It provides 
the interface between the Layer 1 (L1) devices and the 
L3 HAIPE and applications layers. It is responsible for 
generating and maintaining routes and switching 
network traffic. It also contains a certificate store for 
authenticating neighboring nodes and providing access 
to the network. A simplified layer diagram describing the 
L2SNP is provided in Figure 8. 
The application layer above the L2SNP is responsible for 
maintaining an address book, with each line containing a 
destination address, its identity, and rules for exchanging 
data. The L2SNP assumes that the application layer does 
not know how to reach the destination address. From the 
perspective of the L2SNP, packets to and from L3 only 
contain addresses and a payload. There is no additional 
exchange of information between L2 and L3 that helps 
the packet find its destination. When the L2SNP receives 
a packet from L3, it looks at the destination address and 
checks if it already knows a route to that address. If it 
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does, then it attaches the appropriate labels, encrypts the 
packet, and begins transport of the packet.  
If the L2SNP does not have a route to the destination, 
then it sends out network control packets to its neighbors 
to discover routes to the destinations. These network 
control packets go through link encryption and 
decryption at the L2/L1 interface. Once the other nodes 
in the network send back route information, the L2SNP 
then makes a determination of the best route to the 
destination. It creates a label switched path over that 
route to the destination, attaches those labels to the 
packet, then begins transport of the packet. 
 
Figure 8: Simplified Layer Diagram 
After transport has begun, L2SNP Link Encryption 
encrypts the entire packet including the labels, the 
destination address, the source address, and the 
ciphertext payload. L2SNP then sends the entirely 
encrypted packet to the appropriate L1 device to transmit 
the packet to the next node in the route. The next node’s 
L2SNP receives the packet from its L1, decrypts the Link 
Encryption, and then observes the head label. If the label 
says it is not the destination, it pops the label, performs 
another Link Encryption, and forwards the entirely 
encrypted packet to the appropriate L1 to reach the next 
node in the route. 
If a node observes that the head label is for itself, it pops 
off the label, and forwards the packet internally to be 
serviced. If the packet is a network control packet, then 
it stays in L2. If not, then it is a data packet destined for 
L3. The L3 and above then processes the destination 
address, the source address, and the data payload.  
Key Performance Parameters 
The key performance parameters of the L2SNP are 
latency, jitter, packets-per-second (PPS) and throughput. 
To achieve highest possible performance, the 
implementation of this architecture will be divided 
between hardware description language (HDL) 
implemented on a field programmable gate array 
(FPGA) and software (SW). Any function that can 
benefit from hardware acceleration will be evaluated for 
implementation in HDL. Realistically, some functions 
will be optimal for software implementation or for rapid 
prototyping in software.  
Link Security 
The L2SNP provides confidentiality, authentication, and 
integrity services at the link level with each of its 
neighboring nodes. Every Inter-Satellite Link (ISL) and 
ground station Primary Link is secured by the L2SNP. 
All data and network control traffic are secured at this 
link level.  
The two L2SNP units on either end of an ISL will 
negotiate encryption keys for the Link Encryptor in a 
simplified process modeled after Internet Key Exchange 
v2 (IKEv2) to create Security Associations (SAs) with 
each other. Using this method, each link between 
neighboring nodes in the network is encrypted using a 
completely independent and ephemeral key. After some 
period of time, the key expires and a new SA must be 
negotiated. 
The negotiation also securely exchanges certificates 
such that the two L2SNP units may authenticate each 
other’s node identity. The certificates and temporary 
encryption key will be stored securely in the L2SNP.  
Routing Algorithm 
The space mesh environment is nothing like terrestrial 
and aerial networks due to vehicle dynamics and relative 
geometry. Inter satellite communication links range from 
just several kilometers to well over 40,000 km. Relative 
motion creates a network topology that is constantly 
evolving relative to itself and stations on the ground. To 
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top it off, establishing and maintaining links on 
spacecraft platforms is no easy feat.  Dynamic routing 
algorithms for ground systems assume a static physical 
network configuration.  Since that model does not work 
for space based mesh networks, we propose a multi-
variable model that considers: best path and orbit 
models. 
Notionally, the mesh network utilizes a hybrid distance-
vector and link-state routing algorithm to discover routes 
between two nodes and to determine the best path to the 
desired end node.  
Orbit models are used to create a real time mesh diagram 
that allows each node to find the best path with a 
preexisting notion of what the network looks like.  Last, 
schedule based access is supported to account for 
resources. Together, the system will provide a 
revolutionary “smart ad hoc” dynamic routing 
capability. 
Key functions of the routing protocol implemented by 
the L2SNP are route discovery and distribution of data 
between network nodes. A key difference from terrestrial 
mesh networks is that orbits are predictable, and a 
satellite will generally know when it is in view of another 
satellite. The L2SNP executes a best-path algorithm 
based on its real-time knowledge of the network 
topology, then routes the packet accordingly. 
Label Switching 
Once a session is established and provisioned with the 
desired permissions by the secure session handler, it is 
provided with access into the mesh transport fabric of the 
system. The L2SNP employs a Label Switching Protocol 
as the underlying mesh transport protocol. Label 
switching is agnostic to higher level protocols and 
architected to make route decisions very efficiently. We 
leverage this to introduce hardware based routing cores 
that will support well over 1 Gbps of link throughput 
with aggregate routing throughput of at least 10 Gbps.  
The label switching protocol generates Label Switched 
Paths (LSP) over the network by reading routes from the 
routing table. The routing protocol is responsible for 
filling the routing table, and label switching is 
responsible for the actual packet transport through routes 
read from the routing table. After the routing protocol 
finds a route to the destination node, and label protocol 
creates a LSP over that route, a packet can move through 
the route by a series of labels prepended to the packet. At 
each node in the LSP, a Label Switch pops off the head 
label and uses it to forward the packet to the next hop in 
the LSP.  
Status of Research and Path Forward 
Innoflight completed Hardware-In-The-Loop (HITL) 
testing of the initial L2SNP prototype.  The prototype 
software and firmware was implemented on both CFC-
400X hardware and virtual machines: each CFC-400X 
represented the black-side networking of a space vehicle 
(SV) and was running L2SNP, and the each virtual 
machine (VM) represented a Remote Ground Station 
(RGS).  Innoflight based the orbital planes and network 
connections on SDA Transport Layer Tranche 0. This 
initial HITL test demonstrated secure link and route 
establishment.  Future HITL testing includes modifying 
orbit and connectivity assumptions to SDA Transport 
Layer Trance 1 and scaling the number of nodes via SV 
and RGS VMs.  Future HITL testing also will include 
Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS), additional 
cyber security and more additional routing algorithm 
features.  This future HITL testing is not yet funded.  
Ultimately the goal is to demonstrate SSNCP on-orbit 
including software updates based on improving models 
using on actual KPP data. 
HAMOG will begin HITL testing in 2021 including a 
representative commercial ground system architecture. 
Also in 2021 Innoflight will work with a SV partner to 
define how SSNCP will be integrated for an on-orbit 
demonstration. The HITL testing is funded, and 
Innoflight is pursing transition partners for the on-orbit 
demo. 
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